How generated images declare they were made by AI
Every image Rational AI generates carries a machine-readable marker saying a model made it. The marker is embedded in the file itself, so it keeps saying so once the file has left the platform — in a download, an export, or a response from the API.
What is embedded
Generated images carry an XMP packet containing the IPTC DigitalSourceType property, set to trainedAlgorithmicMedia.
That property is the interoperable way for a file to declare it was produced by a generative model. It's what search engines and platform ingest pipelines read when they label content as AI-generated, which is what makes it worth more than a note in a database:
- A database record doesn't travel with the file. Download the image and every trace of where it came from is left behind.
- A visible watermark doesn't survive a crop.
- An embedded marker goes wherever the bytes go.
When it is applied
The marker is written before the image is stored, not added on the way out. Every copy that subsequently leaves — a download, the gallery, an API response — carries it, because they're all serving an already-marked file.
Marking on the way out would leave the stored object unmarked and make correctness depend on every future download path remembering to add it.
Two practical consequences:
- Re-marking is harmless. An image that already carries the marker isn't given a second one.
- Unrecognised formats pass through untouched. PNG and JPEG are marked. Anything else is stored exactly as generated rather than risking a corrupted file — an unlabelled image is a smaller failure than a broken one, and you can't tell the difference after the fact.
The distinction matters if you're answering a question about provenance, because the two are often spoken of as though they were the same thing.
The marker establishes what the file is: something a model generated. It does not establish that nobody has altered the file since, and anyone who wants to strip it can — it's metadata, not a seal.
C2PA additionally binds the claim to a signing identity, so the assertion can be shown not to have been tampered with. That requires a certificate and a signing service, and Rational AI does not do it today. If a tender or a policy asks specifically for C2PA, this does not satisfy it.
Related
- Manage AI models in the registry — documenting what a model may be used for and signing it off.
- Review the audit trail — the record of who reached what inside the platform.
Result
You can state precisely what a generated image discloses about itself: an embedded, interoperable IPTC declaration that a model made it, written before storage so every copy that leaves carries it — and you know the honest limit of that claim, which is that it is an unsigned declaration rather than a tamper-evident C2PA manifest.